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ABSTRACT

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE RESPONSE READY FORCES by MAJ Robert M. Algermissen, USA, 51 pages.

This monograph explores the need to identify humanitarian assistance response ready groups. The increasing number of humanitarian assistance missions performed by the US military indicates the need to identify response ready groups. Response ready groups form the initial reaction forces responding to humanitarian assistance missions.

The planning factors impacting on the decision to determine response ready groups include the Crisis Action Planing system, joint task force organizational dynamics, and assessments of the operational environment. Additionally, the monograph addresses the impact of SOPs, TPFDDL validation procedures, and deployment priorities. Four recent humanitarian assistance operations form the basis for identifying the core response forces. The impact of identifying forces early is presented.

The monograph concludes that the benefits of early identification outweigh any costs. The monograph also addresses the validity of using historical examples to determine core capabilities or units. It also addresses the need to periodically update the response force ready group list to account for force modernization improvements in unit capabilities.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE RESPONSE READY FORCES

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INTRODUCTION

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union the United States armed forces have frequently been involved in a variety of humanitarian assistance operations. One of the major problems operational planners face is how to rapidly transport response forces to the crisis area. RAND published a study of transportation operations supporting the Army's participation in Operation Restore Hope. The study argued that one of the major obstacles to coordinating transportation was the numerous changes in the forces and equipment requested by the CINC/JTF commander. The RAND study asserts that every change to the required force list undermined the ability of the USTRANSCOM to maximize available lift. Changing force requirements creates delays in deployments while newly designated units rush to prepare to depart and earlier identified units stand by. Reducing the number of changes to the unit deployment list permits the USTRANSCOM to use available lift better. Fewer force changes also results in required units arriving on site earlier. Earlier arrival permits the JTF commander to begin relief operations sooner. Using a preplanned list of units to deploy to humanitarian assistance operations has the potential to reduce the number of changes in force lists to improve use of available lift.

Currently, no one has a list of units or capabilities required for humanitarian assistance operations. Developing a list to meet the full range of requirements is difficult for a number of reasons. The crises are varied. They have either a hostile, neutral, or permissive operational environment. Different forces and mixes of forces respond each

time, hence experience is varied. Finally, the level of response is different--it ranges in size from as few as a brigade up to more than a division in size.

To reduce turbulence, and to facilitate early crisis response, it is desirable to define a base force package for use as part of the immediate response to a humanitarian assistance mission. The purpose of this paper is to investigate past humanitarian assistance operations and to identify from these operations the core units or capabilities. Comparing four separate recent humanitarian assistance operations provides the required base data.

The Crisis Action Planning system influences all crisis planning and to a large extent shapes the initial military response. It is possible to determine how time impacts on the speed with which relief arrives in theater and is available to begin helping the people. Often in crisis situations planners from various staffs combine to form the Joint Task Force staff. The staff member's mutual unfamiliarity impedes the speedy resolution of problems inherent with deploying forces. Additionally, the staff member's individual levels of experience and deploying unit preparedness directly influence the speed and efficiency with which forces alert, organize, and deploy.

Comparing four humanitarian assistance operations provides the basis for determining core capabilities or response forces. Included in the analysis is a detailed review of the two major factors that determine which units respond to a crisis, i.e., the operational environment and resourcing criteria. The time each staff had to plan the operation, plus the availability of a preplanned order from which to draw information influenced the time required to deploy forces into the area of operations. Additionally,

the make-up of the primary staffs also impacted on the deployment of forces. Categorizing the response forces into combat, combat support and combat service support eases comparison. Unfortunately, the list of core units will not remain static. It must be changed as unit capabilities change due to force modernization. Fielding near-term technology will improve the core units' capabilities. This is especially true under the Force XXI concept for Army units. The improved capabilities will affect the force structure design of the core units.

Finally, notifying units that they are subject to being called to respond to a potential humanitarian assistance operation may affect how those units train. The units may lose their focus on training for war. Examining the impact of early notification determines cost in terms of combat readiness. The analysis shows if early notification is detrimental to a unit's preparedness to go to war.

The conclusion reviews the evidence presented and answers the proposed question -- should the United States armed forces identify humanitarian assistance response ready groups?

Section 1 Planning Factors

Humanitarian assistance operations provide disaster relief to peoples and countries beset by natural or man made crisis. Whatever the cause, once a crisis is apparent to outside sources, almost all eyes look to the United States to take the lead in resolving the crisis situation. Many Americans and UN member states expect the United

States to respond when humanitarian crises occur. When the United States responds, it often tasks its armed forces to lead the way. Military planners use the Crisis Action Planning (CAP) system, (the same planning system used to respond to a military crisis), to plan for the responses to crisis in operations other than war, including humanitarian assistance.

The Crisis Action Planning system influences the selection of units for participation in a humanitarian operation. Therefore, it is important to explore crisis action planning and other procedures used by the Joint Planning Execution Community (JPEC) to develop plans to meet contingencies. Crisis action procedures expedite planning and provide a series of logical steps designed to ensure that the military response meets the needs of the crisis. The focus of crisis action procedures is on time. When a crisis situation arises, time is of the essence. A key to the effective execution of the crisis action procedures is the completion of the separate phases, and the clearly defined actions required by each phase. Completing the separate phases prevents the national leadership from making ill informed decisions. Although the Crisis Action Planning system is designed to provide rapid response, there are two key factors which generally delay the rapid organization and deployment of relief forces. The first factor is the inexperience of the hastily organized joint task force staff. The members of the newly formed staff have no experience working together and must develop procedures for organizing their work. The second factor is an extension of the first. The quickly organized staff usually has to learn joint movement validation procedures.

Humanitarian assistance operations are always joint operations. The planning staffs contain officers from at least two of the four uniformed services. The planners are hand-picked. However, the officers and the Joint Task Force Commander are initially unfamiliar with each other. Therefore, the commander and his staff must adapt to working together. Army and Marine staffs are trained in the crisis action planning system. Crisis action procedures are very similar to the standard planning processes used by these services. However, Navy and Air Force staffs are not customarily trained in these procedures.¹ The staff members understand the Crisis Action Planning system differently. This means that joint staffs are usually inefficient when first formed; at the very time when every minute can literally mean the difference between life and death. For example, in Operation Provide Comfort when MG Garner assumed command of Task Force-B, he took along only five members of his V Corps staff. The rest of the Task Force-B staff consisted of officers from various headquarters who had never worked together before. As MG Garner noted after the operation, it took a while to gel them into a functional staff.²

Operation Sea Angel provides a good example of the types of difficulties encountered by newly formed JTF staffs. The JTF staff for Operation Sea Angel used three different methods to coordinate strategic transportation. The difference in procedures, command-level involvement, and information required caused confusion, duplication of effort, and inefficiency.³ The resulting confusion delayed the arrival of some assets and, thereby, delayed the delivery of relief supplies to the victims of the cyclone. According to FM 100-23-2, Multiservice Procedures For Humanitarian

Assistance Operations: "The primary means for originating and validating movements requests will be JOPES. The effective movement of material requires close coordination between the JTF service components, UN or coalition forces, NGOs/PVOs, regional CINCs and USTRANSCOM."⁴ By following FM 100-23-2, planners should not make conflicting attempts to coordinate for transportation. However, the staff must coordinate with the agencies listed above to ensure that adequate transportation is provided. The time required to coordinate with all these agencies is another source of friction.

Planners must know what forces are required before they coordinate transportation. As in a war-time situation, a variety of information is needed to determine force requirements. Area estimates or studies are key. Current or complete area assessments or studies may or may not exist for the country or area in which the mission takes place. If the area assessments are not current or are incomplete, the civil affairs direct support team is capable of updating them. This assessment should focus on the cause of the crisis and not on the symptoms. On the other hand, the studies can also identify what additional information must be collected (e.g., infrastructure, host nation capabilities, food capacity, security risks, support assets, number of NGO/PVOs on site, storage facilities, air and sea ports, and roads.).⁵

When a US force commander is directed to provide humanitarian assistance, he should make an assessment of the operational environment. The assessment of the environment should be made in collaboration with other responding organizations. The operational environment includes the political situation, physical boundaries, potential threat to forces, global visibility, and media interest climate for humanitarian assistance

operations. There are three types of operational environments for humanitarian assistance operations - permissive, uncertain, and hostile.⁶ A permissive environment is conducive to humanitarian assistance operations because little or no opposition is expected. Normally, permissive environments are associated with relief operations following a natural disaster or economic collapse. The forces provide the assistance at the invitation of the host government. An uncertain environment exists when host government forces do not have total control of the territory and population in the intended area of operations. The host government's forces may be either opposed to or receptive to operations a unit intends to conduct. Consequently, the commander is uncertain if any violent resistance will be directed towards the relief forces. Hostile environments exist when conditions, circumstances, and influences in the operational environment range from civil disorder, to terrorist action, to full-scale combat. In hostile environments, US forces will very likely encounter violent resistance directed towards them. The resistance can come from any person or group, including host government forces, in the area of operations.

After assessing the operational environment, the commander and his staff determine the types and number of forces needed to provide the required amount of humanitarian assistance.⁷ The commander and his staff will also determine the Rules of Engagement (ROE). The environmental assessment is done as quickly as possible in order to rapidly identify and deploy response forces into the affected area. The operations are usually focused on alleviating the suffering of large populations.⁸ Providing humanitarian assistance usually means rapidly providing food, water, shelter,

and medical assistance to the affected population. The responding military force contains units that can meet these immediate requirements.

Because of the variety of operational environments, forces conducting humanitarian assistance operations must be prepared for a wide range of contingencies. Naturally, as the environment becomes progressively more hostile, the corresponding requirement for security increases while the capacity for humanitarian assistance activities decreases.⁹ Hence, planners should require virtually no combat forces for force protection in permissive environments. Planners should also expect to increase the ratio of combat forces to combat support and combat service support forces as the operational environment becomes more dangerous.

The size of the United States government's humanitarian response is based on factors other than the operational environment. The urgency of the situation (as reported by the initial assessment teams) provides the impetus for the response. The forces available to respond forms the basis for building the response force. Not all United States armed forces are available to respond to humanitarian assistance operations. The United States government encourages NGOs/PVOs and other countries to provide as much assistance as possible. The amount of aid other countries and agencies provide shapes the size of the force the United States sends.

Planners follow three general rules when determining the number and types of US military forces to deploy to a humanitarian assistance operation.¹⁰ First, force mixtures are based upon rules of existence. This means that higher headquarters usually augments certain units with additional assets to assist with operational requirements. For example,

if a mechanized division deploys to an area of operations, its corps headquarters will automatically attach a bridge company. Next is the workload rule. This works the same way as the rule for existence. Additional maintenance units may be attached based upon the number of maintenance man hours required to support deployed equipment. Finally, there are conditional rules. The scenario to which the unit deploys affects the type of augmented support it receives. For example, units deployed to an arid region must have the infrastructure needed to provide adequate water. The higher headquarters augments these units with water production equipment and transport vehicles.

Receiving as complete an area assessment as possible, as early as possible, is critical in humanitarian assistance operations. Additionally, area assessments must be updated throughout the planning and execution phases of the operation. The better the information available, the better the planners can use that information for determining, in coordination with TRANSCOM, the units' order of movement into the area of operation. The time available for planning varies from virtually no time at all to months. The following examples suggest that the time available to plan and the size of the operation will both affect the quality of the plan's execution.

During Operation Provide Comfort there was virtually no reaction time available for the supported CINC to obtain assistance. In effect, none of the initial steps of the crisis action planning procedures were performed prior to issuance of an execution order. Thus the CINC planned as he implemented. The initial guidance given to the CINC was to plan for a two week immediate relief operation for the Kurds in the mountains of northern Iraq. The operation expanded suddenly from a 14 day immediate relief

operation to full scale support of over 700,000 refugees for a minimum of 30 days. This sudden expansion caught the CINC and his JTF planning staff completely by surprise. Naturally, sudden unexpected increases in support requirements result in wasted effort. The time initially spent planning for the two week relief effort for a particular group of refugees could not be recovered. The sudden expansion also prevented USEUCOM Headquarters from providing firm guidance to subordinates. It also kept the supporting CINCs off balance with changing requests for support. Finally, USEUCOM could not provide accurate feedback to senior decision makers and political officials. In this case a twenty-four hour delay in execution to allow for planning would have actually improved the delivery of the required relief.¹¹

Operation Support Hope, the 1994 relief effort in Rwanda, demonstrates another example of how rapidly humanitarian assistance operations can arise. USTRANSCOM received the initial expected movement force list via fax. No one entered detailed movement requirements into the operational time phased force deployment data list (TPFDDL) until after the operation had begun. USTRANSCOM pushed airlift to various ports of embarkation based upon verbal and teleconference requirements.¹² However, the deployment of forces to Rwanda was relatively smooth because some prior planning for a generic assistance mission in the Central Region had already been done. TRANSCOM was able to more effectively use lift assets than if there had been no plan at all.

Operation Support Hope differed from Operation Provide Comfort because Provide Comfort was almost completely unexpected. The USEUCOM commander had

begun some basic 'what if' planning in case a requirement for support developed. However, plans were rudimentary, had not been briefed throughout the command, and were never tested in any wargame or simulated command post exercise (CPX).¹³ On the other hand, USCENTCOM was well prepared for Operation Support Hope. USCENTCOM had 'on the shelf' a planned response to humanitarian and natural disasters in the Central Region. The plan was produced using deliberate planning procedures, published in January 1992, and tested in a CPX in May 1992. The plan included sufficient rather than minimal forces for executing the mission.¹⁴ Clearly, planning time and the size of an operation definitely affect the quality of the plan's execution. The two operations are well-documented in After Action Reviews and the Lessons Learned files. The AARs for Operation Provide Comfort discuss numerous problems that could have been solved with more planning time. Planning staffs lacked important, but relatively simple information. They did not have information about the climate, the type of food the refugees typically ate or avoided, and the amount and best locations for medical assets. Thus, units deployed with their cold weather gear and had to work in summer-time heat.¹⁵ The refugees refused to eat much of the food provided, causing wasted use of lift assets in theater.¹⁶ Finally, some areas had more hospital support than could be used, while other areas had none at all.¹⁷

When alerted for an operation, commanders decide to use either an existing staff as the Joint Task Force (JTF) staff or to construct an 'ad hoc' staff from officers and NCOs available from headquarters in theater. This decision influences the speed and effectiveness of the relief operations. In Operation Sea Angel, a two-tiered approach

toward staffing the JTF worked very well. CINCPAC built the Coalition JTF (CJTF) around existing commanders and their staffs and sent augmentee cells to assist.¹⁸ The benefits were numerous. The commanders and staff were already familiar with each other and their unit's SOPs. They were, therefore, able to focus on solving the challenges Operation Sea Angel presented, without having to familiarize themselves with each other's strengths, weaknesses and expectations.

On the other hand, during Operation Provide Comfort, the JTF headquarters staff experienced the problems inherent in using a hastily assembled staff. The JTF headquarters was an ad hoc staff that grew rapidly in conjunction with the operation.¹⁹ Consequently, the staff failed to properly coordinate the deployment of additional personnel and equipment into theater. For example, there was a clear need for additional civil affairs personnel to augment the Special Forces working with the Kurds. The Commander JTF-PC, LTG Shalikashvili, wanted civil affairs personnel flown to Turkey immediately.²⁰ There was also a need to obtain and provide tents and other equipment. After the operations and personnel staff sections had worked for three weeks to get the civil affairs personnel released from XVIII Airborne Corps, the civil affairs personnel were bumped from a flight to make room for tent poles.²¹

In addition to the confusion occasioned by forming a new staff, there are some other key areas that require a planner's attention early in a humanitarian assistance operation. The planner must set SOPs, movement validation procedures (to ensure the correct manifesting of units and equipment on the proper transportation lift assets), and deployment priorities; priorities that establish what units will deploy in what order to

ensure urgent relief gets to the affected population rapidly. Prior planning would save a significant amount of time for the staff. Increasing the time available to the staff would lead to more effective employment and delivery of units and equipment into theater, resulting in more lives being saved earlier in the operation. A brief review of these time-saving steps clearly demonstrate this point.

First, standard operating procedures, SOPs, enhance command and control by establishing set standards for operations in applicable areas. The more SOPs are established, the smoother overall operations should run. SOPs prevent staffs and units at all levels from searching for information critical to daily operations. Because of the joint and combined nature of many humanitarian assistance operations, SOPs should be developed soon after establishing the JTF headquarters. For newly formed staffs, determining, publishing, and issuing SOPs uses critical time early in the humanitarian assistance operation. Yet, the time invested is essential for ensuring smooth operations in the short and long term. One way to avoid initial confusion is to form the JTF around an established staff. The staff should already be familiar with its SOP. Only "augmentee" staff members or units assigned to work under that headquarters need briefings on the standards required by the established headquarters.

Internal SOPs are also crucial for the deploying units. In Operation Sea Angel, three types of Army forces deployed. The 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group, had well-prepared SOPs for no-notice deployments. Consequently, they arrived with the personnel and equipment they needed for the operation. A 15 man detachment from the 84th Engineers was already in country, having arrived before the cyclone to build schools

for the Bangladeshis. They were adequately equipped to assist with the cyclone relief efforts. The 4th Battalion, 25th Aviation Regiment was unprepared for a short notice partial deployment of the battalion. The deployed section arrived piecemeal without adequate repair parts. Because they were unfamiliar with the area and did not know what supplies were locally available, they experienced numerous operational difficulties.²² Clearly, an SOP for short notice deployments would have assisted 4-25's preparation and deployment into the area of operations.

SOPs can also help improve command and control by standardizing reporting times, formats and information, and meetings at all levels. In Operation Provide Comfort, the 18th Engineer Brigade noted that its SOP did not provide procedures to track various construction projects as was required by higher headquarters.²³ The same brigade also noted that the information provided in intelligence summaries (INTSUMS) from a higher and an adjacent headquarters (i.e., JTF-B and the 24th MEU) often did not agree. To compound the problem, both units issued their INTSUMS concurrently. The two INTSUMS often contained contradictory information making interpretation difficult for the engineers.²⁴ The value of an SOP is that it organizes requirements from higher headquarters so that subordinate units know when to report what information and in how much detail. SOPs provide clarity and cohesion to units for all operational areas addressed, improving the efficiency and timelines of the unit's operations overall.

The second major area that needlessly steals time from operational planners is validation of unit movements into theater, otherwise known as Time Phase Force Deployment Data List (TPFDDL or TPFDD) validation. TPFDD validation procedures

are not clearly defined in doctrinal publications. Consequently, planners spend much time attempting to track and verify the TPFDDL. For planners in Operation Restore Hope, TPFDD validation was a problem early in the operation. CENTCOM issued validation procedures to participating units via a teleconference on 5 December 93, without TRANSCOM's participation. The next day, 6 December 93, TRANSCOM issued its own version of instructions, which conflicted with CENTCOM's. JOPES Vol. 1 does not address in detail how to conduct TPFDD validation. The Sample LOI (p. N-16) shows Earliest Arrival Date (EAD). However, some units used Latest Arrival Date (LAD) when validating. Additionally, all the requirements for Operation Restore Hope were listed as air transportable, even though some units needed to move by sea. Finally, once Unit Line Numbers (ULNs) validation began, invalid ULNs began to appear on the JOPES TPFDD printouts.²⁵

Many people believe TPFDD validation is the act of "freezing" changes to the TPFDD seven days prior to airlift missions and 30 days in advance for sealift. Stopping changes to the TPFDD enables USTRANSCOM to schedule airlift effectively. Unfortunately, the nature of humanitarian assistance operations is such that requirements at the scene often change daily until the operation is two or three weeks old. Therefore, freezing changes to the TPFDD is counterproductive for the commander on the scene.

Members throughout the Joint Deployment community do not understand TPFDD validation. Various aspects are unclear or misunderstood such as: Who does it? How (by what actual mechanism?) is it done? What does it mean when a TPFDD is validated? According to one participant in Operation Restore Hope, TPFDD validation should mean

that the supported CINC needs the cargo; the supported CINC has designated (sourced) the equipment; dates and details are accurate; and funds have been approved.²⁶ TPFDD validation is a very detailed procedure that requires a lot of time to ensure the right units and equipment are transported to the right location at the correct time. The better a planner is at TPFDD validation, the better the flow of equipment and personnel into theater.

Even if a planner understands how to validate a TPFDD, his deployment plans are often changed because units fail to update their information files. Units are responsible for updating their type unit data file, known as their TUCHA file. It contains information detailing the exact type and amount of equipment the unit owns and plans to deploy. In Operation Restore Hope, the TUCHA file for the Army Deployment Medical System, DEPMEDS, did not match the short tons and dimensions of the DEPMEDS for the 86th Evacuation Hospital deployed from Fort Campbell to Mogadishu. The TPFDD data for the 86th was entered into the TUCHA file, but the data was outdated and required multiple changes to update the TPFDD.²⁷ Out-of-date files add to the time it takes to coordinate transportation, delaying unit deployment. Out-of-date files also take valuable time from the planners who must validate the TPFDD. They also force the JTF planners to continually take time to change the original plans for employing those units, since the unit's initial arrival dates form the basis of the plans.

Finally, planners may find themselves caught in a Catch-22 situation when initially trying to identify which units to deploy, and when to deploy them. For example, in Operation Restore Hope, CENTCOM required some initial deployment time estimates

from TRANSCOM in order to conduct course of action analysis. TRANSCOM could not provide the data unless CENTCOM said when the units needed to be in country. But CENTCOM could not provide that data because the unit arrival dates were predicated on the deployment time estimates given by TRANSCOM.²⁸ The problem is one of sequencing. A shortage of available ports of debarkation exacerbates the problem.

The three factors listed above (SOPs, deployment list validation procedures, and deployment priorities) are the main factors that distract a planner. The distractions cause him to use valuable time when he should be focused on accomplishing the mission. They can be attributed to the JTF planner not having a preplanned list of initial deployable units required for whatever humanitarian assistance operation arises. If the JTF planner had this list, much, if not all, of the problems mentioned above could be eliminated. The question that must be answered is twofold -- can such a list be developed and, if so, should the units be notified; i.e., would the benefits of early notification outweigh the costs, if any?

Section 2 Determining Core Response Force Teams and Capabilities

Although humanitarian assistance operations differ in size and scope, there are, nevertheless, characteristics common to all. Comparing four humanitarian assistance operations, each in different operational environments and with varying responses, provides a basis from which to identify common relief units. If common relief units can be identified, it is possible planners can improve initial response times and deployment efficiency. Equating sister service and coalition unit capabilities to those associated with

branches or specialties in the US Army simplifies the comparison process. For example, Navy construction battalions (SEEBEES) and Air Force Prime Beef (power generation) units are equated with Army construction engineers. Combat capabilities will be compared first, followed by combat support capabilities and then combat service support capabilities.

Combat forces use direct and indirect fire weapon systems to engage the enemy.²⁹ Combat forces are primarily infantry, armor, aviation (fixed and rotary wing attack aircraft), field artillery and air defense artillery. Combat units also include Special Forces elements. Combat support forces provide operational assistance to combat units. The combat support forces includes engineer, signal, intelligence, and military police units. Combat service support forces provide the essential logistical functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of an operating force in an area of operations. Combat service support forces provide civil affairs coordination, health services, maintenance, transportation, and resupply.

The three types of force capabilities will be compared in four humanitarian assistance operations. The four operations vary widely in size and scope. The longest effort, Operation Provide Comfort, began on 7 April 1991. Provide Comfort's operational environment is hostile. At the start of the operation, United States and coalition forces forcibly intervened between Iraqi armed forces and the Kurds. At the other end of the spectrum, Operation Sea Angel lasted from 11 May to 13 June 1991 for cyclone victims in Bangladesh. In Sea Angel, the Bangladeshi government and people enthusiastically welcomed all the relief forces. Operation Restore Hope and Operation

Support Hope fall in the center. Operation Restore Hope was the recently completed (31 March 1995) effort to stop starvation in Somalia. Operation Restore Hope began in a hostile environment, but the situation worsened when the forces remained after they had stopped the starvation. Operation Support Hope occurred during the summer and fall of 1994. Its mission was to stop the dying in the refugee camps on Rwanda's borders. Combat forces deployed into central Africa prepared to assist the relief forces if they came under danger, but were never required.

Three key factors affected the deployment of forces into each area of operations. They were: the time each staff had to plan the operation; the availability of a preplanned order from which to draw information; and the make-up of the primary staffs. The time each staff had to prepare initial plans varied from a few days to a few weeks. The staffs for Operations Provide Comfort and Sea Angel had two days and five days respectively.³⁰ CENTCOM had about a month to prepare a plan for Operation Restore Hope.³¹ The staff for Operation Support Hope had one week to prepare its plan.³² The time to prepare for the operations certainly affected the quality of the plan for each operation. However, there are other factors that affected the smoothness of the unit deployments.

Operation Provide Comfort caught the EUCOM by surprise. It also was a much larger operation than originally planned. Initial reports state that the planners thought the operation would last two weeks or thirty days at the most. Additionally, the planners saw only a small requirement for Special Forces personnel. The Vice CINC USAFE replaced the original CJTF less than two weeks into the operation. Consequently, the command change caused staff turbulence when the staff was expanded to meet the larger

requirements. Finally, there was no 'on the shelf' plan the staff could use for reference, forcing the staff to develop the plan from raw information.

Operation Sea Angel's planners experienced considerably less turbulence. Although the mission was also unexpected, the entire situation was less volatile than Provide Comfort. The 3 MEF commander was assigned responsibility at the outset and remained in charge during the entire operation. He had a well-trained staff, since the unit had just participated in the Gulf War. Although there was no 'on the shelf' plan, the staff was unaffected. Virtually all the forces that participated in the mission were from the 3 MEF. The Army and Air Force units participating were minuscule compared to the forces provided by the Amphibious Group 3 and the 5th MEB.

For the CENTCOM planners, Operation Restore Hope was a trying experience. The command had difficulty transporting the Army to Somalia. The precise composition of the CJTF staff is unknown. Additionally, CENTCOM did not have a plan already prepared for an operation of this type. The operation is the largest humanitarian assistance operation ever conducted by the United States military. A wide variety of units from different organizations deployed to Somalia. Therefore, the staff had to work that much harder to coordinate the deployments from CONUS.

Lastly, the planners for Operation Support hope had an approved generic OPLAN for a humanitarian assistance operation in central Africa. Even though the operational area covered a large territory, the total number of forces deployed for the operation was less than an infantry brigade. Although the CJTF's staff was ad hoc, the small size of the

operation and the approved OPLAN greatly assisted the early planning and execution phases.

These four examples reveal four factors that affect execution early in humanitarian assistance operations. The time available to plan the operation determines the amount of coordination possible. The greater the time the more coordination can be conducted. The size of the force employed affects the deployment coordination and the amount of support required for the deploying forces. The larger the number of Services participating adds to the difficulty of the operation. The make-up of the commander's staff affects the overall capability of the staff, especially early in the operation when all the deployment coordination is conducted. Finally, the availability of a plan from which to draw information smoothes the overall process of getting the right forces into theater at the right time.

Combat Forces

Ground combat forces varied in strength throughout all four operations. The largest combat contingents were, as one would expect, in the two hostile environments. In Operation Provide Comfort, in addition to the 10th Special Forces Group, ground combat forces included the 3/325 Infantry (Airborne) Battalion Combat Team and a reinforced Battalion Landing Team (2d Battalion /8th Marine Regiment) from the 24 MEU(SOC). In total, the forces were slightly smaller than an Army brigade task force. A British brigade of Royal Marines, Spanish Para-expeditionary forces, a French battalion of para-marines, a Netherlands marine battalion, Italian Special Forces and an Infantry Brigade (Airborne) augmented the US forces. At its peak, there was at least a

division's worth of light infantry forces in country.³³ No mechanized infantry or armor forces deployed into theater. Additionally, nine countries provided air and helicopter lift. The overall contribution of forces from ten different countries permitted the United States to deploy a relatively small ground combat force for the operation.

In Operation Restore Hope, United States also contributed relatively few ground combat forces. The US Army deployed two light infantry task forces plus an unidentified number of SOF. Approximately two mechanized infantry battalion task forces (with tanks) deployed early, withdrew, and then redeployed back to Somalia late in the operation. Again, coalition partners contributed a large percentage of the overall ground combat forces in theater. Operation Restore Hope had a larger hostile threat than Operation Provide Comfort. Therefore, US Army ground forces in Somalia averaged a heavy brigade size or more.³⁴ Additionally, in Operation Restore Hope the Marines deployed an infantry battalion on shore throughout most of the operation. Up to 16 different countries had ground combat forces (from less than a battalion to a brigade) in theater at any given time.³⁵

In both hostile operations Navy, Marine, and Air Force fixed wing attack aircraft, along with Army and Marine attack aviation rotary wing assets supported the ground assets. At various times, the Navy had an aircraft carrier and its fixed wing attack aircraft available. The data is sketchy, but it appears that Army and Marine attack helicopters never constituted more than a brigade. The available data is insufficient to determine exact numbers of fixed and rotary wing aircraft in either area of operations on any given day.

The terrain and the enemy forces were very different for the two hostile operational environments. The differences played a large role in determining the type and number of forces deployed. Northern Iraq's terrain is extremely mountainous and precluded effective use of mechanized and armored forces. Light infantry is the best and only units suited to confront potential enemy forces in such terrain. The terrain in Somalia, on the other hand, is generally open, rolling, and supports employment of mechanized forces. However, there are cities and towns that require dismounted (light) infantry forces for clearing and securing areas and routes. Therefore, light and mechanized forces deployed into Somalia.

The threat forces were the second major difference in the hostile environments. Iraq had relatively well trained and organized ground forces. In Iraq, the coalition forces essentially had to seal the boundary and separate Iraq's military from the Kurds. In Somalia, the enemy and the populace were indistinguishable. The enemy consisted of loosely organized gangs that easily melted into the crowds in the cities and in the country. There was no boundary between the enemy forces and the populace. During the early portion of the operation, the coalition forces provided only security for the NGO/PVOs and the relief convoys. Because the enemy was so hard to discern from the populace, the security was much more difficult to plan and ensure. Consequently, Operation Restore Hope required more combat forces than Operation Provide Comfort.

In contrast, Operation Sea Angel had a friendly operational environment. There was virtually no threat to the forces in Bangladesh. 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group was the only Army ground combat force deployed to Operation Sea Angel. The

JTF used them to continually provide area assessments throughout the duration of the operation and to provide TACSAT communications for the 24th Bengali division. The bulk of the JTF forces belonged to Amphibious Group 3 and the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade.³⁶ The 5th MEB had over 4600 Marines available to assist in the relief effort, and by the end of the two week relief mission, virtually all had worked on land. However, there are no reports of how many were in Bangladesh at any given time. The staff employed the Marines' combat units only for manual labor.

All the services provided airlift support for Operation Sea Angel.³⁷ The Army contributed the smallest amount, sending only five helicopters from Hawaii. However, the five helicopters flew over half of the total relief supplies moved by helicopters. The Air Force provided a tactical airlift wing detachment, plus an airlift control detachment along with a mobile area port squadron detachment. The Marines and Navy used the organic transportation fixed and rotary wing assets available in the Amphibious Group.

Operation Support Hope's operational environment was uncertain. Therefore units in the area were prepared for violence. United States forces in theater averaged just under 2100 personnel during the last two weeks of the operation when forces were at full strength.³⁸ The combat forces never exceeded 345 light infantry soldiers and deployed into three major cities. They deployed into theater to provide force protection. The total number of combat forces is less than the original plan required. The initial force requirement list identified a need for an infantry brigade (-) by D+30.³⁹ The planners anticipated an uncertain operational environment and wanted to ensure the availability of adequate force protection. However, as the situation on the ground unfolded, the

operational environment did not warrant more than the battalion (-) that deployed into theater during the first week. No attack aviation assets were deployed. At least one battalion of Special Forces personnel deployed into the area. They continued conducting operational assessments and interacting with the populace. They also gathered HUMINT, coordinated relief, and instructed survival techniques until relief arrived. No other US combat forces deployed during the operation. However, combat forces from five other nations did deploy into theater. They comprised a total of just under three infantry battalions in four separate areas, and were also prepared to provide force protection, if required.⁴⁰

Comparison of the four humanitarian assistance operations reveals the following similarities and differences. Light infantry forces participated in each operation. Commanders employed the light infantry in both force protection and in relief roles. Only one operation employed mechanized infantry forces. At least a battalion of infantry, either Marine or Army, was employed for force protection in the hostile and uncertain operational environments. All infantry units were a good source of physical labor for relief work, such as loading supplies, cleaning debris, etc. Armor forces deployed to only one humanitarian assistance mission, Operation Restore Hope. They provided force protection, but they are only effectively employed in favorable terrain.

Attack aviation (fixed and rotary wing) forces deployed in support of the ground combat forces in the two hostile operational environments. The attack aviation did not deploy into Operation Support Hope. Operation Sea Angel obviously did not require attack aviation. Some of the capabilities they brought to the area, for example,

communications, are useful in all environments. However, the attack aviation aircraft are available in such limited numbers it would be wasteful to deploy them when force is not required.

The Special Forces units deployed to each operation. However, they typically were not used in a combat or force protection role. Instead, they provided initial and continuing situational assessments for the CJTF. The CJTF used the assessments to determine how to tailor his force. Special Forces also assisted the populace until the situation stabilized and relief agencies arrived. In all operations, Special Forces personnel collected HUMINT and relayed situation reports to higher headquarters.

Given the recent experience, the following minimum combat forces and capabilities are required for any given humanitarian assistance operation. Each operation requires at least one light infantry battalion, for use as force protection in uncertain and hostile environments and as manual labor in friendly environments. The operations also require one Special Forces element to provide initial and continuing assessments for the CJTF. Also, the Special Forces teams are needed to collect HUMINT and to assist the local populace until relief agencies arrive. There are no other combat forces required for all three types of operational environments. However, in hostile and uncertain environments a mechanized infantry and/or armor battalion can deploy if the terrain is favorable. Combat aviation units are necessary for use in hostile and uncertain environments. One battalion of rotary wing combat aircraft provides the minimum capability required for adequate force protection. At least a squadron of fixed wing combat aircraft is needed to ensure adequate protection.

Combat Support Forces

Together with combat forces, combat support forces deployed to every humanitarian assistance operation. Unlike the combat forces, each combat support specialty took part, to a varying degree, in the four humanitarian assistance operations. However, the data for the combat support forces and the capabilities they bring to the operation is less clear than for the combat forces. Therefore some common sense must be used when analyzing the data to determine the minimum capabilities required.

The exact data on the number of military police units from the different services deployed in each operation is not available. There is no data from Operation Provide Comfort from which to determine the number of Army MP units that deployed. There are no reports detailing the MP's missions. Doctrinally, they assist with traffic control and respond to threats against the forces in theater rear area. Assuming that the Navy and Marine SPs/MPs worked only in the port areas is probably an accurate assumption. The Air Force does not list who secured their airfields. Operation Sea Angel's reports do not provide information about the SPs/MPs missions. They may have had no real role. The Bangladeshi government allowed only minimal forces to remain in the country each night. If the MPs remained in the country overnight, they probably provided security for the equipment left on the island. In Operation Restore Hope, two Army MP companies supported ARFOR units as of 1 Feb 93.⁴¹ However, there is no data available for the number of Air Force SPs and Navy/Marine SPs/MPs employed in the operation. Finally, in Operation Support Hope the only MP unit listed is actually an Air Force SP unit. The Air Force reports do indicate the 100th SP squadron provided security at each airfield.

In Operation Provide Comfort, no troop rolls list military intelligence units. The conclusion to draw is that only the military intelligence personnel organic to the combat forces deployed into theater. However, lessons learned reports state that the intensive use of interrogator translators was very successful. Additionally, the reports state that SIGINT assets worked well and were integrated across the front. Therefore, at least portions of separate military intelligence units deployed, but the exact amount cannot be ascertained. There are no reports of the Navy using intelligence assets during Operation Sea Angel. Numerous military intelligence units deployed to Operation Restore Hope. Enough units deployed that an intelligence brigade headquarters deployed to coordinate the overall efforts in the area of operations. Military intelligence personnel organic to all combat forces also deployed. Elements of the 103rd Military Intelligence battalion were the only intelligence forces deployed to support Operation Support Hope. In all operations the intelligence units strove to ascertain the commanders critical information requirements. Also, Special Forces personnel assisted the intelligence community by collecting HUMINT and forwarding information regularly to the major headquarters.

Engineer units operated extensively in all four operations, providing support to the local populace and to the deployed forces. Usually the infrastructure had suffered severe damage or did not exist. Construction engineers from all four of the services worked in each operation, with only the Air Force not deploying assets to Operation Sea Angel. In Operations Provide Comfort, Restore Hope and Support Hope, the Army provided the bulk of the engineer support. The exact number of engineers in country for the operations at any given time is unavailable.

In Operation Provide Comfort, engineers from the Air Force, Army and Navy provided support to the units and the refugees. The engineer units constructed relocation camps, dug wells, constructed water storage, latrines, lighting storage and other facilities. They also built and repaired roads, MSRs, and airfields. Army engineers were available in Bangladesh for Operation Sea Angel only because a 15 man detachment had been in the country building schools when the cyclone hit.⁴² During Operation Sea Angel, the CJTF did not intend to restore the infrastructure.⁴³ Therefore, the Army sent no additional engineers. Navy construction battalions (SEEBEES) and Marine engineers accomplished the majority of the work in Operation Sea Angel.

In Operation Restore Hope, an entire Army engineer group provided support for the forces in theater and for the refugees.⁴⁴ The Army engineer forces outnumbered the other services by at least a 3 to 1 ratio. In Operation Support Hope, the Army's 94th Engineer Battalion deployed part of a company. Air Force and Navy engineer units were on the initial projected force list, but no lists detail Navy or Air Force units in country.⁴⁵ Additionally, Canada and the United Kingdom provided engineer support to the JTF in Rwanda.⁴⁶

Units deployed to humanitarian assistance operations must have long-range communications capabilities. Therefore, signal units also constitute a large number of CS forces deployed in the four humanitarian assistance operations. Often, telephone lines are inoperative. Many units cannot communicate over long distances with their organic communications. Hence, deploying signal units that can transmit over long distances is critical to the successful execution of operations. Each coalition nation and

major subordinate unit needs single-channel TACSAT capability, if available. UHF and TACSAT proved reliable over vast distances in Operation Provide Comfort. In Operation Sea Angel, an Air Force combat communications group and Army Special Forces units provided the bulk of signal communications.⁴⁷ Army signalers often form the bulk of forces in many humanitarian assistance operations. In Operation Restore Hope, for example, 628 of the 3230 Army forces were communicators.⁴⁸ For Operation Support Hope, Army forces provided the majority of long range communications capabilities. Currently, units need TACSAT capability in order to communicate from the remote locations. Additionally, infrastructure will probably not support communications in country, much less, in theater or out of theater to higher headquarters. Military radio systems are incompatible with those used by NGOs, therefore, work-arounds must be developed to coordinate support.⁴⁹

Reviewing the capabilities the combat support forces bring to the operation determines the minimum capabilities required from those forces. Combat support units play a large role in ensuring the success of humanitarian assistance operations. At least a company of military police are required. In friendly environments, the MP forces assist with convoy control and provide security patrols to protect unit equipment from theft. In hostile and uncertain environments, the MPs conduct operations similar to war. Hostile and uncertain operational environments also necessitate the use of military intelligence units. They collect intelligence as they would in war. Intelligence provides the commander as clear a picture of the area of operations as possible. Therefore, intelligence assets organic to each unit should deploy. At least one battalion of

construction engineers is required in each operation. In all environments, the engineers must be capable of constructing relief facilities. They must also maintain MSRs, dig wells, and perform other construction. Communicators must bring the capability to communicate over long distances. Therefore, at least a company of TACSAT capable teams must deploy. Signal units must provide enough assets so each JTF headquarters and major subordinate headquarters has single channel TACSAT capability. The signal community is capable of augmenting TACSAT communications. The signal community brings MSE, UHF, VHF and other digital communications capability to help the JTF accomplish the mission.

Combat Service Support Forces

Combat service support is the essential element of success in humanitarian operations. This is because the very nature of humanitarian assistance operations focuses on importing and distributing gigantic amounts of relief supplies. The combat service support units actually provide the relief required by the affected populace.

Medical units came from all four services in Operation Provide Comfort.⁵⁰ The Army deployed only aid units organic to its forces, i.e., battalion aid stations and brigade clearing companies. The bulk of the medical assistance came from the Air Force who provided hospital and air evacuation units. The Navy also provided medical units from its amphibious ready group supporting the operation. Medical units from other countries and various NGO/PVOs worldwide augmented the United States' forces medical units. In Operation Sea Angel, Amphibious Group 3 and a Navy Environmental Protective Medicine Unit from Hawaii provided the only military medical support to the US forces

and to the victims of the cyclone. NGOs and PVOs from around the world provided the great majority of the medical assistance to the Bangladeshis. Operation Sea Angel had the fewest numbers and types of military medical units of the four operations. However, three medical units from three other countries arrived, including a field hospital from Australia.⁵¹

Operation Restore Hope provided support similar to that provided by Operation Provide Comfort. Restore Hope's JTF Support Command consisted of a medical group that contained an evacuation hospital, as well as numerous detachments (sanitation, veterinary, dental, entomology, etc.)⁵² Typically, a great number of NGO/PVO medical organizations augment the military medical units. The Air Force provided the bulk of the medical support in Operation Support Hope. The 86th Medical Group deployed with its air transportable hospital and all its assets. Army force lists do not record any separate medical units deploying into the area. Naval and Marine medical units are also not listed among the support units.

The medical capabilities provided by the deployed units focused on emergency relief. Preventive medicine teams and supplies are essential in undeveloped countries to ensure the health of the relief forces as well as the local populace. The priority of care for the populace is usually: rehydrate, water, shelter, food, sanitation, and training. Pediatric medications, especially antibiotics, must also be available in large quantities.⁵³ Surgical capability should also be available early in all operations.

Transportation assets for humanitarian assistance operations came in all forms and amounts. The Air Force provided transportation from C-9s to C-130s in Operation

Provide Comfort. The Army and Marines provided helicopter assets. Navy Sea Stallions augmented the rotary wing lift capabilities.⁵⁴ The military contracted for the bulk of the ground transportation with Turkey and Iraq. The US normally contracted for 500 trucks and 70 busses per day.⁵⁵ In Operation Sea Angel, helicopters provided most of the transportation. In that operation, the roads were wiped out, the unit was sea-based, and the only Army engineer unit in country had its own transportation assets ashore. The Marines employed their LCACs to ferry supplies from ships to the mainland and outlying islands.⁵⁶

In Operation Restore Hope, US prepositioned ships provided the equipment for the ground forces. However getting the equipment ashore was more difficult than envisioned.⁵⁷ The shallow depth of the port at Mogadishu, (the only usable port in the country) sea currents, and load plan problems all delayed the off-load of equipment. On shore, Army, Marine, and Air Force truck transportation units helped transport equipment and supplies throughout the country. Operation Restore Hope was the only humanitarian support operation to use mechanized and armored assets to transport combat forces. In Operation Support Hope helicopters and HMMWVs along with Army 2 1/2 and 5 ton trucks provided the majority of inland transportation. Air Force cargo planes delivered the supplies to airports. From there US Army transportation units delivered the relief supplies to the refugee camps.

Transportation units require several capabilities. The most obvious is the capability to haul enough relief supplies to the distribution centers. In order to make efficient use of the transportation assets, adequate material handling equipment must be

available. This includes forklifts for bulk packets as well as cargo nets for helicopters. Units must provide a large manual labor pool when material handling equipment is not available.

Water transport and production units are critical assets in all humanitarian assistance operations. Relief forces employ Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units (ROWPUs) extensively to provide purified drinking water for military and the stricken populaces. In every operation water was critical for the local populations' survival. Water transportation and distribution assets also played a key role in bringing relief. For example, in Operation Provide Comfort, relief workers discovered the value of East German "Trinkwasser" water trailers. The trailers carry up to 6000 liters of water, have several spigots on each side, travel well on roads and can be pulled across moderate terrain if required.⁵⁸ For the most severely stricken in the populations, medical units provide oral rehydration solutions.⁵⁹

Ordnance units deployed to only two of the operations, Provide Comfort and Support Hope. The ordinance units provided the ammunition and ammunition transport for units in Iraq and in Somalia. Explosive Ordnance Disposal units also deployed and worked extensively in both hostile operations.

Civil Affairs (CA) units deployed to every operation. The number of CA personnel provided for each operation varied based upon operational requirements. The largest civil affairs deployment went to Operation Provide Comfort. Three full CA companies, 63 members of a fourth and a brigade headquarters deployed to meet mission requirements.⁶⁰ Detachments from a CA brigade, a CA group and a CA command

participated in Operation Sea Angel.⁶¹ Operations Restore Hope and Support Hope had the least civil affairs involvement. One team deployed to each operation.⁶² At the tactical level the CA units' capabilities include identifying and obtaining local resources, facilities, and support. They also minimize civilian interference with military operations. CA units supplement the human intelligence collection effort and focus staff attention on civilian and cultural factors that could impact on military operations. Operationally, civil affairs units provide advice and assistance in population and resource control, civic action, and civil assistance. They support other SOF in foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare operations by providing advice and assistance on population and resource control. They also perform civil administration missions by helping local authorities maintain stable and viable civil governments.

Planners should also consider establishing port reception committees or groups. These groups facilitate the arrival, organization and deployment into theater of deploying units. In Operation Provide Comfort, the 18 MP Brigade (-) and the 284 MP Company arrived at the airfield at Incerlik without a reception committee. As a result, they had to establish their own POCs to assist the arrival of additional soldiers and equipment. The units experienced problems with the Turkish customs officials. The officials prohibited the use of the units' organic transportation to convoy personnel and forced the units to reorganize transportation.⁶³ Consequently, the deployment of two units from the port to their areas of responsibility was delayed. The port reception committees are designed to preclude the problems experienced by the MPs.

The Army generally does not control airfields for fixed wing aircraft operations. The Air Force has Tactical Airlift Control Elements (TALCEs) perform this critical function. TALCEs operated in all four humanitarian assistance operations. They were especially critical in Operation Support Hope which used six separate airfields in and around Rwanda.⁶⁴

Finally, planners should employ a Disaster Assessment Response Team (DART). They are civilian experts contracted by the department of state to advise, provide input to the CJTF commander, and do on site emergency direction because of their extensive experience dealing with emergencies. Special Forces or Civil Affairs unit members augment the DART on occasion. The DART is usually the first US government representatives on the scene of any disaster. They provide the initial crucial assessments of the situation. Using these initial assessments, the CJTF begins to determine the size and make-up his JTF. He forecasts what capabilities the military forces will need to bring into the area to stabilize the situation, improve it, and then turn it over to the local government.

In summary, the JTF planner will need combat, combat support and combat service support capabilities in every operational environment. Considering the four humanitarian assistance operations examined, the following are the minimum assets and capabilities required in a humanitarian assistance operation:

Combat forces:

- one light infantry battalion,
- one Special Forces element, usually at least a battalion.

Combat support forces:

- at least one construction engineer battalion,
- single-channel TACSAT capability for each JTF headquarters and for each major subordinate unit headquarters,
- one company of military police (this assumes that military police deployed on shore into Bangladesh),
- military intelligence units/assets organic to the forces deploying.

Combat service support forces:

- surgical capability and organic medical forces for the military (NGOs and PVOs often provide more than adequate support to civilian populations in the areas),
- one battalion of transport helicopters,
- the capability to contract for ground transportation.

Clearly, throughout the operation, the forces will be tailored according to the initial and follow-on assessments of the situation. The above list of minimum required capabilities provides a planner the basis to determine an initial generic force list that can meet this requirement. The initial force list can be matched to specific units that will be notified to be prepared to respond when a crisis occurs. The units can then determine if they are prepared to deploy to a humanitarian assistance operation. They will have the opportunity to update information, SOPs, etc. The units can take actions to ensure they are prepared to participate in a humanitarian assistance mission. Immediately upon implementation of Crisis Action Planning, the TRANSCOM can assign specific

transportation assets to those units with confidence that the transportation assets are adequate to transport the entire unit. This should increase the efficient use of the limited transportation assets. More efficient use should provide the CJTF with more of the right forces in the right place at the right time.

Section 3 Impact of Early Identification

Once a planner determines the core capabilities for humanitarian assistance operations, it will be advantageous for operational planners in the various theaters to identify the units that meet the core capabilities. Identifying units early will enable the planners and the units to prepare better to respond to a no-notice or short-notice humanitarian assistance mission. The Army already does this to a certain degree for combat crisis situations, through use of the XVIII Airborne Corps quick reaction forces. Often, though, these quick reaction forces are not needed in operations other than war.

Increasingly, units that are not part of the rapid response forces are being tasked to respond quickly. These units do not receive the resources needed for training and maintenance and therefore are not as well prepared to deploy as those in the XVIII Airborne Corps. The lesser prepared units have experienced a variety of problems when deployed on short notice. The units delay their deployments while they correct readiness shortfalls. FM 100-23-2, Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations, notes that the success of a humanitarian mission often hinges on a timely response.⁶⁵ Therefore, actions that improve unit deployment readiness, in whole or in

part, will speed the initial response. Increasing their ability to deploy rapidly will result in increased capability to conduct humanitarian assistance operations.

There are a number of low-cost actions that units can perform to prepare better for participation in humanitarian assistance operations. Notifying units to prepare for deployment would solve many problems. Early notification does have some drawbacks in addition to benefits. Using a Plan-Prepare-Execute model facilitates comparing the benefits and drawbacks.

Plan

Prior planning can resolve a number of common problems for deploying units. Some of the more common problems are establishing deployment plans, determining the order of movement into the theater, and using liaison officers, LNOs, to help coordinate actions between various units and agencies. Analyzing each of these problem areas identifies potential solutions to reduce or eliminate the problems.

Early notification provides time for units to make detailed plans of their entire alert, deployment, execution, and re-deployment procedures. Units can determine equipment upload procedures and times, the optimal order of movement to the ports, logistical and support requirements. Additionally, to speed deployment, the units can obtain support from other units or agencies. For example, at one installation, units had coordinated to assist units selected for deployment.⁶⁶ The non-deploying units agreed to supply equipment and personnel to the deploying units to transport equipment to port, and to clear and secure the barracks and motorpools. The assisted units deployed more rapidly than if they had to deploy on their own.

Alerted units can also determine the various types and amount of transportation required to deploy personnel and equipment. Moving unit equipment has posed some special problems in recent humanitarian assistance operations. For example, a communications unit had constructed shelters on some trucks to improve its mobility.⁶⁷ The unit failed to update its unit data file in JOPES. Therefore, TRANSCOM deployed aircraft large enough to load only the trucks. Unfortunately, the shelters were too large for the trucks to fit in the aircraft's cargo hold. The unit discovered the problem only after the aircraft arrived to load the vehicles. Removing the shelters delayed the unit's deployment. Additional aircraft were diverted to load the shelters. The effect was that the signal unit arrived in theater later than originally planned. Because additional aircraft were diverted to load the shelters, other unit movements were delayed. In turn, the JTF commander was denied the equipment he expected to be in theater by the original deployment date.

In another unrelated incident, USAREUR units ordered to Turkey for Operation Provide Comfort had to scramble to acquire blocking and bracing equipment.⁶⁸ Since the Army considered these units to be "forward deployed" to counter the former Soviet threat, the units did not have the blocking and bracing equipment needed for airlift. These two incidents demonstrate that all units are subject to being deployed out of sector. Therefore, thoroughly analyzing out of sector deployment requirements will identify shortfalls. The units can plan for (or correct) the shortfalls prior to execution.

Planning for humanitarian assistance operations identifies the units' need to establish liaison. During combined operations, US units routinely establish liaison with

forces of each nation (as required) and with higher headquarters.⁶⁹ Most headquarters do not have designated liaison officer positions and must use members of their own staff. The headquarters must also provide the LNOs dedicated transportation and communications equipment. Commanders do not like to lose members of their staff, but they realize that establishing liaison with other headquarters and civilian agencies facilitates understanding, coordination, and mission accomplishment. Therefore, units can, and should, identify the personnel and equipment requirements for liaison duty, and must be prepared to function without them. The military commander should send the best possible liaison personnel to interact with other agencies. Increasing the coordination among the various agencies responding to a humanitarian assistance operation improves the efficiency of the overall effort. Dispatching efficient liaison teams encourages good coordination with other national contingents in a multinational force.⁷⁰

As part of the liaison effort, the JTF can form a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC). The CMOC can be tasked to carry out the guidance and directions of the Humanitarian Operations Center. The CMOC performs liaison and coordinates military support to meet the needs (requests for support) of the humanitarian assistance organizations.⁷¹ The CMOC, if activated, must be staffed with soldiers familiar with the available support capabilities. This means that if an operation is joint, then the CMOC must also be joint. The J-5, Task Force Plans and Programs, Civil-Military Operations cell, should also be activated early. In Operation Provide Comfort, the J-5 cell activated two weeks after the start of the mission. Additionally, only US Army personnel staffed

it.⁷² As a consequence, initial coordination between the JTF forces and NGO/PVOs was poor and time was wasted. Early unit notification presents only one remote drawback during the planning phase. Planners may devote too much time working on plans to support a potential humanitarian assistance operation. They may ignore the more critical work of updating and coordinating their war plans. Planners must determine how much time they can spend working on a humanitarian assistance plans, versus working on updating and verifying war plans. Hand-in-glove with time spent planning for future operations is time spent preparing for future operations.

Prepare

The preparation phase presents the biggest quandary for units subject to participation in a humanitarian assistance mission. This phase encompasses the training the units conduct in preparation for participation in a humanitarian assistance operation. On the one hand, planners may argue that training for a humanitarian assistance operation detracts from a unit's readiness to go to war, i.e., its primary mission. This is because the tasks a unit executes in war (its Mission Essential Task List or METL) may be different from the tasks it executes in a humanitarian assistance operation. On the other hand, some planners believe that responding to humanitarian assistance operations requires no special train-up, that military forces are flexible, and can rapidly adjust their focus once notified to deploy. This second claim is particularly true if a unit's mission requirements in humanitarian assistance operations are not much different from its wartime METL requirements. The primary factor that influences the level of difference

between wartime and humanitarian assistance METL tasks is the operational environment.

Hostile operational environments most closely replicate actual war. All the forces (combat, combat support and combat service support) perform tasks most closely related to their war-time roles and missions. Combat forces will actively engage in force protection missions, attempting to prevent enemy forces from interfering with the delivery of relief supplies. The combat support forces will also perform their wartime METL tasks. The only major difference may be for the combat engineers. Their focus is on keeping resupply routes open. There will not be much of a need for establishing obstacles, digging fighting positions, or conducting deliberate breeches. The combat service support forces will be the least affected by the operational environment. They will perform the same tasks in all three environments. Therefore combat service support units deploying to a hostile environment will not perform tasks much different than if they were deploying for war.

In uncertain operational environments, the potential for hostilities directed against US forces is harder to determine. The military forces will conduct operations cautiously, prepared to respond with overwhelming firepower if threatened.⁷³ When the environment stabilizes, combat and combat support units may receive instructions to provide forces for manual labor tasks. Otherwise, the combat forces will redeploy once the potential for danger is eliminated.

In permissive operational environments, there is virtually no armed threat to the military forces. Hence, permissive environments do not require many combat forces.

Combat forces that deploy will probably perform duties as common laborers, i.e., transloading supplies by hand, clearing debris, etc.⁷⁴ Combat support forces deployed to permissive environments will perform duties more closely in line with their wartime METL tasks than the combat forces. The combat service support forces should not experience any differences in their duties.

Clearly in hostile operational environments the duties performed by all forces should mirror very closely their wartime METL tasks. The type of duties changes somewhat, especially for the combat forces as the operational environment changes from hostile, to uncertain, to permissive. However, the difference in the duties also becomes easier. It goes from having to train continually on perishable skills to performing common labor tasks. Therefore, the preparation for humanitarian assistance operations should not require much time, especially for the more peaceful environments.

Execute

The payoff for early unit identification is in better execution. The order of unit arrival into the area of operations should improve. Sequencing was a particular problem in Operation Restore Hope.⁷⁵ The Army air terminal and port operations personnel arrived too late to optimize throughput of follow-on forces. Consequently, problems associated with the download of the ships and the operations of the APOD and SPOD were attributable to the late arrival of these air and sea port operations personnel. The supported combatant commander is responsible for theater reception and onward movement of arriving forces and sustainment.⁷⁶ In this case, the JTF planners overlooked

the need for the air and sea port personnel in the area of operations prior to the arrival of the main body.

The order of unit arrival affected Operation Sea Angel.⁷⁷ In the absence of air and seaport personnel, unqualified personnel marshaled and off-loaded MAC aircraft. Marshaling and off-loading were slower and less effective than when the qualified personnel were available. Additionally, the personnel diverted marshaling and off-loading the aircraft were not available for their normal duties elsewhere. Properly controlling the arrival of units into the area of operations contributes significantly to the stabilization of the situation. It also speeds the build-up of capabilities that permit the supported combatant commander to seize the initiative and to conduct successful decisive operations early.⁷⁸ The order of arrival does not happen by chance. It is planned.⁷⁹ The exact order of force deployment into an area of operations is difficult to determine. For the forces deploying to humanitarian assistance operations, there should be relatively few problems executing the operation if the unit had time to prepare.

In summary, there are potential advantages and disadvantages to early notification of units for humanitarian assistance operations. The advantages center around the ability to provide the units time to plan and prepare for their roles. The additional time to coordinate should result in more efficient deployments and therefore, more efficient overall use of the forces in the area of operations. The disadvantages also center around time. The units may spend too much time planning and preparing for their potential humanitarian assistance operations, at the expense of combat readiness. However, losing their edge for combat readiness only applies to a relatively small percentage of units

(armored and mechanized combat forces) who deploy to relatively very few humanitarian assistance operations. Light combat forces, including SOF, profess to very little combat readiness degradation overall. Humanitarian assistance operations hardly affect the combat support and combat service support forces, since they generally perform the same duties as in combat.

The advantages of early notification outweigh the disadvantages. The time spent preparing will pay the dividend of improving the unit's deployment capabilities. Units can prepare SOPs, make coordination for deployment assistance, and can ensure their TUCHA file data is correct so higher headquarters knows how much lift a unit requires to deploy. A remote risk is that units will devote too much time planning and preparing for a humanitarian assistance mission, to the detriment of its combat preparedness. The unit's leaders must be capable of determining the detrimental effect, if any, of planning and preparing for a humanitarian assistance mission instead of preparing for combat. Most units feel that their combat training breeds organization, aggressiveness, and flexibility in their soldiers. These qualities will allow them to change focus rapidly from preparing for combat to performing a humanitarian assistance mission. Therefore, most, if not all, will focus on training for combat while acknowledging additional requirements for humanitarian assistance operations.

CONCLUSION

The increase in humanitarian assistance operations shows no reprieve for the immediate future. All units may eventually be tasked to assist in humanitarian missions.

Reports from the most recent operations detail a litany of problems that lead to deployment delays. The deployment delays impact negatively on the overall operations. Units arriving in theater late or out of sequence introduce inefficiency throughout the relief effort. No one can plan for every situation or circumstance. However, there are some steps units and planners can take to make deploying to a humanitarian assistance operation more efficient at all levels.

The first step is to identify initial response forces early, before receiving word to respond to a crisis. The initial response forces' structure meets the core requirements for response to a humanitarian assistance mission. The following units compose the initial response forces. One light infantry battalion for use in force protection or as a pool for manual labor tasks. One Special Forces battalion to provide augment the DART team's situational assessment of the operational environment. The SF teams also would assist the local populace with surviving until relief supplies arrive. Additionally, the SF team would contribute HUMINT to military intelligence units throughout the operation.

In the combat support arena, identifying at least one construction engineer battalion provides the required capabilities to maintain MSRs and construct the minimum types of structures to support the relief effort. The signal battalion needs to be capable of providing single channel TACSAT capability to at least the JTF headquarters and the headquarters of the major subordinate units. A company of MPs provides the necessary security forces to protect against theft and can also be the initial rear area level one or two response force. Finally, the organic military intelligence assets for each unit provide

the unit commanders with current situation updates and project enemy courses of action (if applicable).

The combat service support minimum initial forces include surgical capability available early for the deployed forces. Additionally, the deployed forces must include their organic medical personnel and equipment. One battalion of rotary wing transport aircraft provides the lift necessary to be able to rapidly transfer people, equipment, and relief supplies throughout the theater.

The above initial force package has the assets to provide the minimum core capabilities determined from comparing the four recent humanitarian assistance operations. If planners employ the initial response forces list, it has the potential to improve humanitarians operations executions immediately. Using the initial response forces list provides planners, units, and the USTRANSCOM time to plan and prepare for short-notice deployments. Using the force list gives the planners a window of time, during which the initial forces are deploying, to better develop the rest of the response force structure. The planners will have additional time to notify units and TRANSCOM. The additional time affords the opportunity to coordinate the deployment sequence better.

For the identified units, there are a number of advantages. They are able to review deployment procedures, ensure the correct equipment is available to deploy by rail and by air, and that their unit TO&E data base is correct in the TUCHA file. The units can also focus their training on humanitarian assistance tasks, as long as it does not affect their wartime readiness. The TRANSCOM also will benefit from early

identification of initial response forces. The TRANSCOM's biggest benefit is that it can make more efficient use of its limited assets. The updated unit files provide the required data so TRANSCOM dispatches the correct numbers and type of transport craft to the units from the start. The TRANSCOM will not waste its efforts early in the operation and can stay proactive in anticipating the JTF commander's requirements.

All of the benefits listed above will assist the JTF commander. He can plan on having certain capabilities and units immediately deployed for his use. The JTF commander uses the same window the planners use to determine the next units to deploy. He uses the window with his planners to tailor the overall force structure. More time to plan allows the assessment teams to send more information about the situation throughout the area of operations. With more time and information available, the commander and staff make better force structure decisions. The improved decisions also improve the sequencing of forces into the area. Improved sequencing improves the use of those forces upon arrival in theater and hastens the delivery of relief to the needy.

Although the identification of initial relief forces has many positive aspects, there are some areas that must still be explored. First, planners must examine the composition of the forces between the reserve and active duty. Many of the forces involved in the four operations examined are reserve forces. Identifying reserve forces may not be possible based upon the impact for Presidential select reserve call-up. Identifying reserve units may be a political rubicon. Therefore, to avoid any controversy, the initial deployment list must identify only active duty units. Identifying and deploying initially only active duty forces may impact on the military's strategic flexibility.

Another area to examine is the appropriateness of the type of forces that deployed to each operation. The forces that deployed were the forces that were available. No real analysis is available detailing if the forces employed were actually the right mix for the situation. The public closely scrutinized Operation Restore Hope after the deaths of the Army Rangers. However, it is the lone case. The analysis focused of an incident and situation which occurred after accomplishment of the initial mission to stop the Somali's starvation.

Finally, if planners use an initial force list, they must have a system to update the force list every time the units modernize. Typically, every two years the unit TO&Es change due to modernization. Therefore, planners must update the initial list to account for improved force capabilities and force structure changes.

This year, JSCP guidance to the unified CINCs includes instructions to prepare a generic plan for response to humanitarian assistance operations in their theaters.⁸⁰ The availability of this plan will assist planners who may suddenly find themselves having to prepare for a humanitarian assistance operation. Having already identified base line ready groups will place them hours, if not days, ahead of the planners who responded to Operations Provide Comfort, Sea Angel, Restore Hope. No one can foresee or plan for every contingency. However, doing everything possible to make the most efficient use out of the US forces limited assets is worth attempting. Identifying humanitarian assistance base line ready groups will pay off more in benefits than it will cost in time and effort.

ENDNOTES

¹ Paul A. McCarthy, Operation Sea Angel, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1944), 12.

² Joint Uniformed Lessons Learned, No Number, Operation Provide Comfort, LTC Newman.

³ Joint Uniformed Lessons Learned, Number 70439-30182, Operation Sea Angel, LTC Singer.

⁴ Department of Defense, FM 100-23-2, Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations, Final Draft, (Langley Air Force Base, VA: Air Land Sea Application Center, March 1994), 4-8.

⁵ Ibid., 4-6 and 4-7.

⁶ Ibid., 1-8.

⁷ Ibid., 1-7.

⁸ US Army Combined Arms Command, Newsletter No. 92-6 Operations Other Than War Volume I Humanitarian Assistance, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1992), 1.

⁹ FM 100-23-2, 1-9.

¹⁰ LTC Manzo, Phone conversation with the author, 3 March 1995.

¹¹ Joint Uniformed Lessons Learned, Number 51235-27595, Operation Provide Comfort, MAJ Roccoco.

¹² Joint Uniformed Lessons Learned, Number 22452-90972, Operation Restore Hope, CDR Jonas.

¹³ John R. Brinkerhoff, Ted Silva and John Seitz, US Army Reserves in Operation Desert Storm: Civil Affairs in the War with Iraq, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1993), 24.

¹⁴ MG Waldo D. Freeman, USA, CPT Robert B. Lambert, USN, and LTC Jason D. Mines, USA, "Operation Restore Hope: A USCENTCOM Perspective", (Fort Leavenworth, KS, US Army Command and General Staff College), Military Review, September 1993, 62.

¹⁵ Joint Uniformed Lessons Learned, No Number, Operation Provide Comfort, SFC Ledford.

¹⁶ Joint Uniformed Lessons Learned, No Number, Operation Provide Comfort, SFC Ledford.

¹⁷ Joint Uniformed Lessons Learned, No Number, Operation Provide Comfort, LTC Newman.

¹⁸ McCarthy, Operation Sea Angel, 11.

¹⁹ Joint Uniformed Lessons Learned, Number 91055-06088, Operation Provide Comfort, LTC Morgan.

²⁰ Brinkerhoff, Silva, and Seitz, US Army Reserves in Desert Storm: Civil Affairs in the War with Iraq, 58.

²¹ Joint Uniformed Lessons Learned, No Number, Operation Provide Comfort, LTC Newman.

²² McCarthy, Operation Sea Angel, 17.

²³ 18th Engineer Brigade After Action Review Lesson Learned, No Number, Operation Provide Comfort, No Author.

²⁴ 18th Engineer Brigade After Action Review Lesson Learned, No Number, Operation Provide Comfort, No Author.

²⁵ Joint Uniformed Lessons Learned, Number 22455-11427, Operation Restore Hope, CDR Jonas.

²⁶ Joint Uniformed Lessons Learned, Number 42850-63954, Operation Restore Hope, D. Rumbaugh.

²⁷ Joint Uniformed Lessons Learned, No Number, Operation Restore Hope, CDR Garnto.

²⁸ Joint Uniformed Lessons Learned, Number 22455-69357, Operation Restore Hope, CDR Jonas.

²⁹ Department of the Army, FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Symbols, Initial Draft, (Washington, DC: January 1994), 1-52, 1-53, and 1-54. Interestingly, the field artillery and air defense artillery units are placed under combat support assets. For this

monograph the field artillery and air defense artillery units are included in the combat forces portion of the analysis where this author knows they belong.

³⁰ US Army Combined Arms Command, Operation Provide Comfort AAR timeline, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, no date) no page, and McCarthy, Operation Sea Angel, 6. In Operation Provide Comfort the President issued the initial alert order to deploy on 5 April 1991. The Air Force executed the first food airdrops on 7 May. Special forces units entered the area immediately after the initial food airdrops. On 12 April the Vice CINC USAFE, LTG Shalikashvili, departed on a fact finding trip to the area and on 17 April assumed command of the operation from the 24 MEU commander. In Operation Sea Angel the 3 MEF staff received notification to provide humanitarian assistance to the Bangladeshi government on 10 May 1991. Initial assessment elements arrived in country beginning on 11 May and the relief effort began in earnest five days later.

³¹ Before the November elections, President Bush declared that US forces would deploy to Somalia to stop the mass starvation. The media prominently featured Somalia's plight daily until the starvation ended. Initial forces landed on the beaches on 7 December.

³² US Army Combined Arms Command, TRADOC Combined Arms Assessment Team briefing slide, no date, Chronology of Operation Support Hope, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, no date), 4. On 22 July 94, the President directed CINCEUR to stand up a JTF. By 30 July JTF-A was established in Goma. Of note, the situation in Rwanda had been deteriorating since 7 April when the massacres began. The CINCEUR's staff had about a three month lead to become to monitor the situation. Consequently, there was more time to prepare than from the day the President gave the order to be prepared to deploy.

³³ MCLLS Long Report, Number 80327-20432, dated April 28 1992, LTC Linn, Operation Provide Comfort.

³⁴ US Army Combined Arms Command, TRADOC Combined Arms Assessment Team briefing slide as of 8 Mar 93, Operation Restore Hope Heavy Brigade Organization chart (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned) Appendix J-1.

³⁵ Ibid., as of 1 Feb 93, Appendix D.

³⁶ McCarthy, Operation Sea Angel, 1,5,8 and 12. Interestingly, the newly elected government of Bangladesh needed to be portrayed as overall in control of the operation. Therefore, because of the political ramifications, the CJTF used a sea-basing concept. He ensured there were no more than the minimum number of forces, i.e., less than 500 military personnel, in Bangladesh each night.

³⁷ McCarthy, Operation Sea Angel, 29.

³⁸ USAREUR Command Center briefing 18 Aug 94, Operation Support Hope update as of 17 Aug 94.

³⁹ Force Requirement List, JTF Rwanda Relief, J3 Message Identification Number 1938130, 260200Z Jul 94.

⁴⁰ UNAMIR Deployment Plan briefing slide as of 300700Z Jul 94.

⁴¹ US Army Combined Arms Command, TRADOC Combined Arms Assessment Team Operation Restore Hope briefing slide, ARFOR Organizational Chart as of 1 Feb 93, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned) Appendix E.

⁴² McCarthy, Operation Sea Angel, 7.

⁴³ Stackpole, H. C. III, LTG, USMC, "Angels From the Sea" (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute), Proceedings, May 1992, 61.

⁴⁴ US Army Combined Arms Command, TRADOC Combined Arms Assessment Team Operation Restore Hope briefing slide, Operation Restore Hope Heavy Brigade Organization Chart as of 8 Mar 93, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned) appendix J-1.

⁴⁵ JTF Rwanda Relief, J3 Message 193813 dated 260200Z Jul 94.

⁴⁶ UNAMIR Deployment Plan briefing slide as of 300700Z Jul 94.

⁴⁷ McCarthy, Operation Sea Angel, 29 and 30.

⁴⁸ US Army Combined Arms Command, TRADOC Combined Arms Assessment Team briefing slide, Operation Restore Hope Heavy Brigade Organization chart as of 8 Mar 93 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned), Appendix J-1.

⁴⁹ MCLLS Long Report, no number, no date, MAJ Suchanek.

⁵⁰ Operation Provide Comfort daily update slide, no date.

⁵¹ UNAMIR Deployment Plan briefing slide as of 300700Z Jul 94.

⁵² US Army Combined Arms Command, Combined Arms Assessment Team, Operation Restore Hope JTF SC Organization Chart as of 1 Jan 93 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned), Appendix E.

⁵³ MCLLS Long Report, Number 61051-06675, COL Gangle.

⁵⁴ Cushman, John R., LTG (Ret), "Joint, Jointer, Jointest", (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute), Proceedings, May 1992, 80.

⁵⁵ LTC Fuller, Memorandum for DCG-TNG, CALL, Subject: Review of CALL Newsletter, Humanitarian Assistance, 20 Feb 1992.

⁵⁶ McCarthy, Operation Sea Angel, 8.

⁵⁷ Kassing, David, Transporting the Army for Operation Restore Hope, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND), 1992, 56.

⁵⁸ Joint Uniformed Lessons Learned, No Number, Operation Provide Comfort, LTC Newman.

⁵⁹ UN High Command for Refugees Lesson Learned, International Red Cross and Center for Disease Control Nutrition, Vaccination and Diarrhea survey in refugee camps, Operation Provide Comfort, No Date.

⁶⁰ Brinkerhoff, Silva and Seitz, US Army Reserves in Operation Desert Storm: Civil Affairs in the War with Iraq, 58

⁶¹ McCarthy, Operation Sea Angel, 29.

⁶² US Army Combined Arms Command, TRADOC Combined Arms Assessment Team, Appendix E, Operation Restore Hope, ARFOR Organizational Chart as of 1 Feb 93 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned), Appendix E, and JTF Rwanda Relief, J3 Message 1938130, dated 260200Z Jul 94.

⁶³ Joint Uniformed Lessons Learned, no number, Operation Provide Comfort, no date.

⁶⁴ Operation Support Hope briefing slide, JTF Organization, dated 14 Sep 94, no Headquarters listed.

⁶⁵ Department of Defense, FM 100-23-2, Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations, 4-4.

⁶⁶ Joint Uniformed Lessons Learned, no number, Operation Provide Comfort, LTC Newman.

⁶⁷ Joint Uniformed Lessons Learned, no number, Operation Provide Comfort, LTC Newman.

⁶⁸ 18 Engineer Brigade AAR, Logistics Section, Paragraph N, no page number.

⁶⁹ US Army, FM 100-5, Operations, (Washington, DC: June 1993), 2-2 and 5-5.

⁷⁰ William J. Droll and Steven Metz, The Army and Multinational Peace Operations: Problems and Solutions, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1993), 16.

⁷¹ FM 100-23-2, 4-26.

⁷² Joint Uniformed Lesson Learned, Number 61822-02900, Operation Provide Comfort, LTC Velton.

⁷³ Operation Support Hope briefing slide, In Operation Support Hope, the combat forces performed security operations and were on call to respond with quick reaction forces if required. After it was determined that no real threat existed, the combat forces provided manual labor to distribute relief supplies.

⁷⁴ McCarthy, Operation Sea Angel, 12. In Operation Sea Angel, the combat forces from the MEU were available solely because of their attachment to the Amphibious Group assigned the humanitarian assistance mission. The Marines worked as common laborers to assist the Bangladeshi people to recover.

⁷⁵ Joint Uniformed Lessons Learned, Number 12080-39905, Operation Restore Hope, MAJ Boatman. The air and sea port personnel arrived well after two maritime preposition ships had arrived, and after the 10th ID (L) advance party, and the first element of the division's main body had arrived.

⁷⁶ US Army, FM 100-17, Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization, (Washington, DC, October 1992), 4-13.

⁷⁷ Joint Uniformed Lessons Learned, Number 72253-74300, Operation Sea Angel, COL E. G. Hoffman. The MAC Airlift Control Element (ALCE) and the Mobile Aerial Port Team were not deployed with the first elements into Bangladesh. Additionally, no mission support teams to operate forward bases supplied by the APOD were available for the first three days.

⁷⁸ FM 100-17, 4-7.

⁷⁹ No FMs actually address this issue in detail. Most leave it up to the commander to determine based upon the situation (METT-T). Naturally, tactical and operational level headquarters should be deployed early into the area of operations. This will facilitate executing current operations, conducting future planning, and coordinating with host nation and/or coalition forces. Additionally, other key command and control enhancing units should also be deployed early. In forced entry or hostile operational environments, combat forces must secure the ground before less combat capable units arrive. However,

shortly after ensuring areas are secured, control elements should arrive. For example, the port detachments and tactical airlift control elements should deploy into theater before the great majority of other forces. The appropriate CS and CSS headquarters must deploy with the initial force. The primary emphasis is to retain the flexibility to reconfigure units and adjust the deployment schedule according to the commander's needs. Historically, early in an operation, the commander's needs change quite frequently.

FM 100-23-2, Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Operations, emphasizes that the force commander must be capable of communicating his will to the US military, coalition forces, NGOs/PVOs, UN agencies and any other organizations involved. Communications, therefore, must be established early in the operation. However, establishing communications between the sister services is often difficult.

All military operations rely upon good communications. One of the critical areas that must have good communications early in an operation is airspace control. The coordination for airspace operations follows normal airspace coordination procedures for any joint or coalition operation. In humanitarian assistance operations, the additional burden on coordination involves the humanitarian assistance cargo flights conducted by NGOs/PVOs/IOs. It may overwhelm host nation facilities. The JTF may have to establish an interim airspace coordination system. Close coordination with all parties will improve safety and increase the efficiency for delivery of humanitarian assistance supplies.

⁸⁰ COL Stephen Speakes, Phone conversation with the author, 3 March 1995.

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